Remembering Liu Xiaobo

The West’s Responsibility in Upholding His Legacy

By Andrew J. Nathan

 This article is taken from Foreignaffairs

The late Chinese dissident Liu Xiaobo, who passed away from liver cancer on Thursday after spending the last eight years of his life in jail, famously wrote, “I have no enemies and no hatred.” His words were intended to be a part of his final statement during his December 2009 trial, at which he was charged with “inciting subversion of state power.” But he was never allowed to make any last remarks. When his note was later published as an essay, readers discovered that Liu had even thanked, by name, his prosecutors and the cell warden at the detention center where he had been held. At the time, some Chinese dissidents criticized him for forgiving his oppressors and saw it as a form of capitulation. But the statement surely played a role in the decision of the Nobel Peace Prize committee when it awarded him the prize in 2010 “for his long and nonviolent struggle for fundamental human rights in China.”

Over the years, Liu’s influence has grown even as his voice has been silenced. Most Chinese dissidents have chosen nonviolent methods to try to change the Chinese regime. The New Citizens movement led by civil rights activist Xu Zhiyong asked its members to speak and act as citizens under the Chinese constitution, which includes the right to vote and criticize the government. Xu subsequently received a four-year sentence in 2014 for “gathering a crowd to disrupt public order.” During this “rights protection” movement, lawyers and activists tried to use the Chinese courts to protect victims of rights abuses; some 300 of them were rounded up in July 2015, and a number still remain in jail or are in custody. In 2015, five feminist activists were arrested after demonstrating against sexual harassment and domestic violence.

In China, nonviolent protest has been met with pervasive surveillance, harassment, random violence, and criminal prosecution. What this reveals, of course, is the regime’s sense of vulnerability. Ironically, survey after survey shows that the Chinese government enjoys high levels of trust and approval among the Chinese population. But the regime seems to understand that its popularity is due to economic growth, information control (few ordinary Chinese citizens have heard of Liu Xiaobo), and repression. The lesson of Tiananmen in 1989—and, after that, of the sudden collapse of communism in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union in 1990–91—is that attitudes of support can be fleeting. If an authoritarian regime is perceived as weak or hesitant, citizens’ resentment of pollution, urban crowding, pressures at school, corruption, and the government’s pervasive lying can surge to the surface.

The key to the government’s treatment of Liu Xiaobo, therefore, has been risk aversion: Don’t let him get away with challenging the government’s control over what can be said in public (which he did by publishing his democracy manifesto, Charter 08, in 2008). Don’t let him read his final statement at his trial. Don’t let him attend the Nobel Prize ceremony in Oslo. Don’t release him from his 11-year prison sentence in spite of his cancer diagnosis. And don’t allow him to go abroad for treatment in the final days of his life. Everything must be managed by the rigid rules of political control in order to avoid sending a signal of weakness to the world—and especially to the Chinese people.

WILL BURGESS / REUTERS

Liu Xiaobo, March 5, 1995.

There was a time, in the early 1990s, when China made concessions, albeit minor ones, to the West on human rights issues when faced with the threat of trade or diplomatic sanctions. That was why human rights activists such as Wei Jingsheng and Wang Juntao were released from prison and allowed to come to the West. But now China is rich, and one by one the Western powers have given up on officially receiving the Dalai Lama and sponsoring resolutions critical of China at the Human Rights Council in Geneva. In the face of China’s crackdown in Hong Kong, the United Kingdom hasn’t dared to speak up. In seeking to restore diplomatic ties with China, Norway essentially apologized for awarding the Nobel Peace Prize to Liu, although its concession was obscured by diplomatic jargon. The United States is the only country that issues a statement each year on June 4, on the anniversary of the Tiananmen massacre, but that statement has become pro forma. Beijing now simply pays no heed to foreign pressure. Its position to the world is that China respects human rights, but in its own way: the country has the rule of law, and Liu is a convicted criminal; it has a system for medical parole and medical care, and it follows its own procedures.

But Western governments must continue to press Beijing on human rights issues. China is not monolithic. It is changing, and support from outside, even if only moral, is crucially important to Chinese citizens who want freedom, dignity, and the rule of law. As Liu himself wrote in 2002, “[F]or people like me, who live inside a cowardly dictatorship, which is a prison of its own kind, every little bit of good-hearted encouragement that springs from the human nature of people who live in other places…causes us to feel gratitude and awe.”

Moreover, China’s efforts at thought control are no longer contained within its borders. By denying visas to journalists and scholars, putting pressure on universities and film festivals, censoring Hollywood film scripts, surveilling Chinese students in the West, and so on, China seeks to control what is thought and said about China in other societies. It is not doing this to promote a Chinese model, the way the Soviet Union promoted communism, but instead to protect China’s international image and prestige. But that does not make its effort less dangerous to the freedoms that we cherish in the West.

Again, Liu Xiaobo said it best. In a 2006 essay published on the Chinese-language website Ren Yu Ren Quan (Humanity and Human Rights) he warned:

When the “rise” of a large dictatorial state that commands rapidly increasing economic strength meets with no effective deterrence from outside, but only an attitude of appeasement from the international mainstream, and if the communists succeed in once again leading China down a disastrously mistaken historical road, the results will not only be another catastrophe for the Chinese people but likely also a disaster for the spread of liberal democracy in the world.… [F]ree countries must do what they can to help the world’s largest dictatorship transform itself as quickly as possible into a free and democratic country.

As China’s influence grows in this world, the West would do well to heed Liu’s words.

Interesting Map in 1914 – Tibet was shown in Mongolia transit

Sources Time travel

My Tibetanness

 I was a shepherd

Slinging small Tsamkhuk around the waist

 Banding sling shot around the shoulder

 Tuning whistles, directing pals:

 So obedient they are

Otherwise if I command with sling shot.

Mesmerizing her fluting voice

 Echoing by passing the rocky terrains

As it was traveling by herself

 So jolly I used to be; Small world,

 With companions in vales and hills

 Like pasted in beauties to ranges

 It was my homeland

Westerners call it paradise

 Middles easterners never heard it

 Easterners are drying up

 China stamped "treasure house"

 Stationed on its mighty grandeur

Severity is buttoned alarming

She is Tibet!

A yellow haired marked his corridor

 With his monopolistic statehood

He was an ambassador

 And asked "you from?"

I resolutely claimed "Tibet"

And said "not in my list"

 "Check stateless" I implored

Tightening his wrinkles

 Coined "You are Indian by passport"

 "No, identity card" and explained "Foreigner from stateless"

 And asked “prove your stateless state"

"Here you go sir" I showed the yellow document again

 Then he expounded "you're stateless without stateless identity"

 I said "No. Foreign guest ...Tibet"

 But "Uncle Nehru finished his ink while listing Tibet in his world history and China had good trade"

I was talking to an Indian ambassador

Ode to a young man

By Tibetan Shepherd

Should it be the same;

The last sight of Ama to me

Kissed on my red crimson cheek

Pressing me under her warmth

Momentarily wrapping her twinkling eyes

Somber stage of cold shed

Like a dewdrops in early autumn dispersed

I held my heart pouncing

She was disappeared distantly

Never gotten after vales of the hill I never turned in

Yet never have I stopped enchanting almost an empty Mantra

I shall return, I shall return

Would it be the same;

The last sight of Ama to you

Unblinking through the furs of hers Chupa

Endlessly hoped your return

She might have followed your footprints

Beading her rosary faithfully

Would have broken hers into stateless

Whilst your soul returned lifeless

Shouldn’t she feel forgiven,

When her dream was stashed into cold blood

At the dark stained hill of Dharamsala;

It should turn so bloody now.

Should it be the same;

Spinning into the sojourn of statelessness

Life is certainly uncertain

Refugee in incredible – suffrage is not meant to us

Like what it shone in the prism of international arcs

I often being lifeless;

Whilst treating me inhuman in localized brutalities

You often being numbed;

Whilst beating you into the cow dungs,

The stains of Gaddes’ hatred,

Released coldly on you young man,

Stashed your heart apart,

Equally stains all who are after yours.

Goons must be quenching the thirst of the next row

Watch out all innocents pelting through

Gaddes are at your door step!

Why Tibetans are geopolitical buffer zone ?

Tibetan are geopolitical victim. The current policy of China towards Tibetan never aims to loss the impression Tibetans will be continuing the grime condition. But the political scene has both birth and death period. It is extreme important for Tibetans to pursue our own goal to bring ourselves back together in Tibet

Chinese Media: Long March “not” to be CCP News Workers

By Tibetan Shepherd

Screening the media and its governance in China has been viewed as “political tool” and nationalization of Chinese media have been under carefully state management departments (D. Rawnsley, 2006). However, the perception of international audience in regard of Chinese media might have different concept. The discourse of briefing the concept of media freedom constitutionally viewed from freedom of speech in China – rhetorically underscoring issues in Tibetan region is an eyeball for many studies. This study enables to weigh the ethical standard of Chinese media and freedom of speech as whole.

 Overview of Chinese Media

Surging through sequences of Chinese Media development, it heavily depended on eras of Chinese Communist party’s reigns. China in mid 1980s was in outburst of its outnumbered population and poverty, especially when the paste of economy was stagnant and Chinese oversea countries like Singapore and Taiwan emerged into the surge of rapid economic development. The model adopted by those countries enforced China to open its economy to the western world and stimulated corporate sectors especially state enterprises of China to march in the inclusive model. The primarily function of media in china is to “promote Chinese Communist Party’s agenda- maintaining the social stability and consolidating its power hold” (Shirk, 2010). In the model of Commercialization of Chinese Media, there has been steep forward growth mainly because of fair and balance commercial news that are favored by capitalist idealists in China. On other hand, professionalism in the state of art, which are often subjected as act against the state authority and face harsh sentences and subjugating under patriotic re-education programs – thus CCP never shows leniency to any public discourse which may lead  to anti-governmental symbols.

In the preposition of Chinese media and regulation, most the media are state owned publication otherwise illegally or commercialized outlets (non-political publication 100 per cent commercial releases). There are several important factors which influence in imparting Chinese media ethical standard, values and question of self-regulations.

Regulators and structural framework of freedom of speech:  Media

Central propaganda Department centrally administered and engineered by the front runners of Chinese Communist Party. China in post-Communist streaked and strove to promote its political publicity by means of brainstorming and ideological conversion of mass. (Lee, 2008) China during all the predecessors masterly imposed/indoctrinated Chinese Communist Party’s ideologies through a special mechanism i.e. propaganda programs in mainstream media praising party legacies and rejuvenation of Chinese spirits – to be loyal to the government. In the leverage of Propaganda Department, it has influence over every:

“newspaper offices, radio stations, television stations, publishing houses, magazines, and other news and media departments; universities, middle schools, primary schools, and other vocational education, specialized education, cadre training, and other educational organs; musical troupes, theatrical troupes, film production studios, film theaters, drama theaters, clubs, and other cultural organs, literature and art troupes, and cultural amusement parks; cultural palaces, libraries, remembrance halls, exhibition halls, museums, and other cultural facilities and commemoration exhibition facilities”.8 (Shambaugh, 2007) 

In the grip of regulations, China has several actors responsible for gathering, disseminating, filtering and execution of information in main domains. There are several organs of functioning the propaganda in day to day life. For instance, the Council of Information Office monitoring the content of the newspapers, Minister of Education strictly conduct and developing educational textbook content mainly pouring the party’s ideologies and Chinese version of historical facts, Ministry of Culture in similar way, monitors arts, literature and theatrical works. In the frame of Chinese propaganda and empowerment of information in the digital age. Activisms in Cyberspace and Chinese citizens grew out of the controls. Ministry of Information Industry (MII) and State Council Ministry of Culture, Film Council and the Department of Radio and Television controls the whole cyberspace. The term internet no longer exists in China, rather the cyberspace in the region of China has been separated by harsh policy called the Great Firewall. The regulation framed by MII is to block international Internet Protocols and to build their own Intranet. (Neumann, 2001)

Despite draconian policies of Chinese Communist Party in self-censoring the media in China, the growth of social media and its grass root activisms in China challenges the harsh circumvented policies. (Shirk, 2010) There were instances of reshaping the professionalism and ethical standard in China’s social media enforcing the state media to take up the issues. Case of young migrant in China, called Sun Zhigang, was a symbolic. When Sun was travelling from his city to Chinese City, Guangdong, he was not able to provide document to prove his eligibility to travel and forced him under Detention and Repatriation System and found dead in later. Media across the nation started publishing about the mysterious and unexplained dead of young migrant. This episode ran through commercial media for long run and forced to abolish Detention and Repatriation. Media in China adopted two different kind of professionalism (1) new way to challenge the authority by using professional techniques to publish articles outside CCP agenda and (2) direct challenge by confronting with the government though the media professionals faces direct threat and serious consequences such as long time imprisonment and closure of media organizations such as Freezing Point media. (Shirk, 2010)

To posit Chinese Media professional code of Conducts, ethical standard and driving values with western conducts such as those adopted by World Congress of the International Federation of Journalists, adopting/adapting the moral principles of Chinese media conducts are still in transitional period of development. Political constitutional rights to speech/expression is the foundation of media in China – where media in China drives its values from commercial competition and stick arbitrary rule by Chinese Communist Party. In legal connotation, Chinese media are termed as “news workers” of CCP (Shirk, 2010).

Chinese communist party and its organs of regulators imposed various restrictions on media to avoid quotations from foreign media since New York Times exposed Chinese former premier’s Wen Jaibo wealth. Xenophobia is one case that China never allows international media in China in both virtual and by wire. Recent crackdown foreign media such as Gmail and Bloomberg and other social media like Facebook and Twitter marks stringent step and sees no legal reformation in the terms of media rights in China.

Press Freedom Index of China since 2004

Press Freedom Index (PFI) is published by Freedom House in France and been an independent group of Journalists working across 150 countries. PFI indicates scored countries in the terms of quantified band/ranks in terms of Press Freedom. There are several parameters which actually describes about the arbitrary state of Chinese government. For instance Media Pluralism which represents the degree of media representative opinions, Media Independence measures the degree of media functionality independence under an authority, Environment and self-censorship gives overview of environmental factors where journalist are working, legislatives of frameworks of media and its effectiveness, Transparency screens freedom of press production without fear and censorship and the infrastructure under which the professionals work. The indication of 0 being the best press freedom and 100 and nearly shows the least degree of Press Freedom  (Freedom House, 2013).

Sources:Press Freedom Index publication

China’s PFI in last ten years indicated that press freedom in china is grave concerns. Topping its ranks in among 179 countries at the bottom and this figure can conceptualize rough image of freedom of speech, particularly press freedom in China.

Interpretation of Self-immolation inside Tibet by Chinese Media

In the prism of China’s policy to curtain the press freedom in China under tight control under Chinese Communist Party’s grip. It is impossible to function any kind of media independently, if so, will shut down immediately and press under stringent actions against whoever doing so. The plight of Tibetans in Tibet can be virtually understood from the spat of self-immolations in Tibet and abroad. Research on self-immolation in the University of Aberdeen underscored the wills of those Tibetans and witnessed that “the combined march towards economic development and political consolidation in the Middle Kingdom leaves little room or security for the ordinary citizen will surprise few China watchers of course. However, that it might lead to the kind of final rejection of both personal aspiration and governmental order witnessed in political self-immolation is a troubling lesson for the entire international community – which is, in effect, all of us – that supports China’s prodigious growth” (Mills, 2012) .

Sources :ALJA ZEERA

Insight into shocking case of Tibetans chose to burn themselves into the fire in different time period marks the seriousness of Tibetan condition in Tibet. The first Tibetan who chose to adopt such horrific method was Thupten Ngodup in 1998, dousing him into the gasoline to dead and marked his resistance as a heroic sacrifice for Tibetan people. In 2011, 15 Tibetans self-immolated and shockingly, 87 Tibetans chose to set themselves into the fires. According to ALJA ZEERA , 143 such cases happened since 1998, in which 30 in 2013 and 11 in 2014. However, there are variances in terms of numbers of cases of self-immolation across the world.

Interpretation that is made in China on Tibetan self-immolation would have different connotation and censors the realities embodies in Tibet. Although the case of Tibetan self-immolation has not widely covered by general media in China or Tibet, I was curious to see how Chinese media cover on Self-immolation in Tibet.  Media in China has substantial freedom to cover environmental issues. The case of Tibetan specially self-immolation is a sensitive issue and carefully covered in major state owned media in China. In the notion of Western Media has difference from Chinese media.

There is limitation in terms of language while the reference I have used is based on English Newspapers available in internet in China. To seeking information in China’s media discussing the norms, values and standard of the press, I have already laid the foundation Media in China in Chapter one. The concept of Chinese government scorn censorship mechanism.

Search of words “Tibetan Self-immolation” on Sino Media, Beijing Today and Xinhau News on following areas.

The concept of Media Pluralism and participatory media on “Tibetans’ last-resorted method of self-immolation” received a large coverage from both political institution and media at large and participatory media such as social media and citizen journalism across the world. However, the media mentioned: Shanghai Daily, Beijing Today and Xinhau News carried news about self-immolation which are to be suitable for Chinese Communist Party where the media should not spur incitement of public and avoid sensitive issues such as Tibetan and other minorities’ cases. Sino media posted Local monks not self-immolating resisting that no self-immolation took place in Tibet, where the news sources was injected by Pedma Choling, the Chairman of Standing Committee of Tibetan Autonomous Region. Xinhau News also carried almost the same headline denouncing the Dalai Lama as the “Plotter”   In similar manner, the same media carried news about a Buddhist monk self-immolated in Nepal distorted the actual news disguising the Buddhist monk as non-Tibetan. Media outside the prism of China confirmed that the monk was a Tibetan whose motive was to protest against continuous occupation of Tibet by China.  In searching of word “Tibetan self-immolation” in the web portal, it talks more about self-immolations from Japan, Israel and Syria and omitted almost all Tibetan cases.

When the internet space in China is gripped by walls of the “great firewall”, the latest regulation slaps the internet community of China by legitimizing great firewall and ensuring the political consolidation of Communist party of China. Article 3 in the regulation reaffirmed the basic principles of Self-regulation and Professional Ethics for Internet the Industry are being patriotic observance of law, equitableness, trustworthiness and honesty dictates the peoples’ loyalty to the law. The obligation is enforced to internet provider to pledge to inspect and monitor foreign website and disallow if it disseminates harmful information.

The case of citizen journalism in China has been under severe grip of constant watch. For Tibetan case, Tibetan Chinese blogger openly shared her views on why Tibetans are self-immolated and often put under house arrest and many other Tibetans bloggers, writers and singers expressing their views on Tibetans livelihood in Tibet, often face imprisonment and subjugated them as the separatists plotted by exile leader the Dalai Lama. Despite self-immolation in Tibet is an act of Political rejection of Chinese government continuous repression in Tibet, media organs carefully follow the state regulation and fabricate the news, for instance, Xinhau News made story of Tibetan immolator Tenzin Sherab in Yushu due to rejection from his girlfriend whose actual will reads as the same as other Tibetan self-immolators carried. There are many instance of Tibetans being forged under state separatisms activisms, for instance, Wechat application is said to be one of the most popular smartphone application for communication, a Tibetan woman called Kalsang in Tibet was arrested in spreading hatred messages including storing banned songs praising Tibetan leader the Dalai Lama and his portraits. China monitored information through her phone where application Wechat was installed and being used.

Conclusion

In terms of Media independence and pluralistic in China, environmental journalism has found a space of leniency provided without underestimating the state-centered and market-centered explanation (Yang, 2005) especially when the stride of economic uplift in China left China’s policy makers no choice otherwise to give pluralistic concept to Chinese NGOs and media to focus on environment damages.

Whilst the foundation of Political system in China also shapes the journalistic empowerment, transparency from self-censorship and legitimacy of Chinese media. Chinese policy makers often configures western model of development based on fundamental democracy as non-suitable to Chinese context and rule of law, during the annual plenum, with Chinese socialist Character would carter better views China. When the freedom of speech in China is claimed as “Chinese Characteristic”, it is still under the control of Communist Party. For short run media in China would not see positive reflection in terms of legal reformation, at least before 2020. Journalists will remains as the news worker of Chinese Communist Party obligated with firm belief to the party’s drive.

Therefore, the state of media in China is in transitional period adopting new concept of pluralism and ethical values – with direct confronting to the indoctrinated ideologist Party or grooming through new ideated forms. In other words, media professionals give societal issues without shedding much highlighted to challenge political views against the state government. Softer issues such corruption driven by present leaders, environmental and traditional values of China gains highly reputed values in media in China

Ethical standard and values in Chinese media drives from very strident rule by law – where media (every form) are connoted as Chinese Communist Party’s “News Workers” and awakening the ideological frame work of Moas. Referring to one the present Chinese President Xi Jinping propagandas on regaining “correct views of art” among Chinese Artist, Films directors and TV producers in the country side especially to minorities and border areas. Here “Correct view of Art” according to pioneering media like The Guardian resonated as Moa style of Propaganda.

Therefore, for the case of Tibetan and other minorities, freedom of speech is within the limitation of CCP preamble – loyalist and anti-Dalai Lama.

download in PDF Version

References

18. Rawnsley, D. (2006). The media, internet and governance in China . China Policy Institute, 18.

Freedom House. (2013). 2013 Press Freedom Index – Methodology. Freedom Hourse.

Lee, K. S. (2008). Political Regimes and media in Asia. Oxon: Routledge.

Mills, M. A. (2012). Going down in flames: Self-immolation in China,. The South Asianist, 21.

Neumann, A. L. (2001). The Great Firewall. Janeiro de .

Shambaugh, D. (2007). CHINA’S PROPAGANDA SYSTEM: INSTITUTIONS, PROCESSES AND EFFICACY . The China Journal, 4.

Shirk, S. L. (2010). Changing Media, Changing China. New York: Oxford University Press.

Yang, G. (2005). Environmental NGOs and Institutional Dynamics in China. SOAS University of London, 22.

Behind the APEC Summit’s landmark deals

Behind the APEC Summit’s landmark deals

Religion and Community Development in Tibet Series

Pioneering talk renowned Khenpo Tsultrim Lodroe of Larung Gar, at George Washington University’s Elliott School of International Affairs

Tibet Governance Project

The Tibet Governance Project is honored to host

Khenpo Tsultrim Lodroe of Larung Gar

Religion and Community Development Series

Khenpo Tsultrim Lodroe མཁན་ཆེན་ཚུལ་ཁྲིམས་བློ་གྲོས།

The Tibet Governance Project at George Washington University’s Elliott School of International Affairs is honored to host Khenpo Tsultrim Lodroe, one of the foremost civic leaders in contemporary Tibet.  A part of the core leadership of Serta Larung Gar, Khenpo Tsultrim Lodroe has led a public conversation inside Tibet about education, language issues, the environment, public health, HIV/AIDs awareness and vegetarianism.  Noted for his scholarship and publications on Buddhist philosophy in both Tibetan and Chinese, Khenpo is a leading figure in faith-based civic engagement in Tibet today.

This is Khenpo’s first visit to North America.  He will be giving his inaugural U.S. public lecture on Thursday, April 2.  Khenpo will also be leading a series of academic seminars on religion and community development in contemporary Tibet from March…

View original post 221 more words

The Question of Tibet

By Jayshree Bajoria

Jayshree Bajoria South Asia Researcher, Human Rights Watch.

The March 2008 anti-government clashes in Tibet and other regions in China brought the decades-long dispute once more into the international spotlight demonstrating the depth of historical disagreement over the territory. Tensions between China and Tibet have persisted since People’s Republic of China was founded in 1949. China says Tibet has been a part of China for many centuries now, a claim refuted by many Tibetans. Chinese authorities use this claim to support their sovereignty over the territory while proponents of the Tibetan independence point to periods in Tibetan history when it enjoyed self-rule. Meanwhile, Chinese government policies in Tibet have fed the conflict. These inlude restrictions on cultural and religious freedoms of Tibetans, attempts to change the demographics of the region through migration of ethnic Chinese, and an unwillingness to open dialogue with Tibet’s exiled spiritual leader, the Dalai Lama. Experts believe the dispute over Tibet will persist as long as China refuses to speak to the Dalai Lama, who has been in exile in neighboring India since 1959. China, however, has sought to bypass the 73-year-old Dalai Lama and concentrated instead on efforts to control the process that will determine his successor.

Unresolved Political Status

The contemporary dispute over Tibet is rooted in religious and political disputes starting in the thirteenth century. China claims that Tibet has been an inalienable part of China since the thirteenth century under the Yuan dynasty. Tibetan nationalists and their supporters counter that the Chinese Empire at that time was either a Mongol (in Chinese, Yuan) empire or a Manchu (Qing) one, which happened to include China too, and that Tibet was a protectorate, wherein Tibetans offered spiritual guidance to emperors in return for political protection. When British attempts to open relations with Tibet culminated in the 1903-04 invasion and conquest of Lhasa, Qing-ruled China, which considered Tibet politically subordinate, countered with attempts to increase control over Tibet’s administration. But in 1913, a year after the Qing dynasty collapsed, Tibet declared independence and all Chinese officials and residents in Lhasa were expelled by the Tibetan government. Tibet thenceforth functioned as a de facto independent nation until the Chinese army invaded its eastern borders in 1950.

But even during this period, Tibet’s international status remained unsettled. China continued to claim it as sovereign territory. Western countries, including Britain and the United States, did not recognize Tibet as fully independent. After founding the People’s Republic of China in 1949, the new communist government in China sought reunification with Tibet and decided to invade it in 1950. A year later, in 1951, the Dalai Lama’s representatives signed aseventeen-point agreement with Beijing, granting China sovereignty over Tibet for the first time. The agreement stated that the central authorities “will not alter the existing political system in Tibet” or “the established status, functions and powers of the Dalai Lama.” While the Chinese government points to this document to prove Tibet is part of Chinese territory, proponents of Tibetan independence say Tibet was coerced into signing this document and surrendering its sovereignty.

“Experts point to the years from 1913 to 1950, a time when Tibet behaved like a de facto independent state, to argue that Tibet was not always part of China.”

Experts also point to the years from 1913 to 1950, a time when Tibet behaved like a de facto independent state, to argue that Tibet was not always part of China. But China blames the British influence at the time for provoking the idea of Tibetan independence and refuses to be bound by any treaties signed between Tibet and Britain during that period. This includes the 1914 Simla convention where the British recognized Tibet as an autonomous area under the suzerainty of China.

The political status question is also complicated by uncertainty about what constitutes Tibet’s borders. The Chinese only accept the term Tibet for the western and central areas, the area which is now called the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR). This area was directly ruled by the Lhasa government when the Chinese invaded in 1950. But Tibetan exiles have been demanding a Greater Tibet which includes political Tibet in modern times (TAR) as well as ethnic Tibetan areas east of TAR, most of which Tibet had lost in the eighteenth century.  These areas, earlier known as Amdo and Kham, are now scattered among parts of Chinese provinces of Sichuan, Qinghai, Yunnan and Gansu. The March 2008 anti-government protests, which started in Lhasa, soon spread among the ethnic Tibetan areas in these provinces.

Experts say there is no document in which the Tibetan people or their government explicitly recognizes Chinese sovereignty before the invasion of 1950. But Robert Barnett, a Tibet specialist at Columbia University, says the importance of this argument lies not in its role in the legal debate, but in what it indicates in terms of the political realities on the ground. “The fact is that most Tibetans seem to have experienced themselves and their land as distinct from China,” he says.

Conflict with China

Since China’s invasion, Barnett says, “China’s policies towards the Tibetans can perhaps best be described as a mix of brutality and concession.” The first Tibetan uprising of 1959 resulted in the flight of the Dalai Lama and about 80,000 Tibetans. During these years thousands of Tibetans were allegedly executed, imprisoned, or starved to death in prison camps. So far no Chinese official has publicly acknowledged these atrocities. This period also included a policy of induced national famines that resulted from tenets of the so-called Great Leap Forward, when Beijing set up communes in agricultural and pastoral areas. The Cultural Revolution, the next phase of Mao’s revolutionary politics, followed in 1966 and continued in effect until1979 in Tibet. During these years, all religious activities were prohibited and the monastic system in Tibet was dismantled. The campaign included an attempt to eradicate the ethnic minority’s culture and distinctive identity as a people.

“If India is indeed a liberal democracy, it must be willing to speak out about gross Chinese human rights violations.” — Sumit Ganguly, Indiana University

Deng Xiaoping’s rise to power in China in 1978 brought forth a new initiative to resolve the Tibet question. Besides reaching out to the Dalai Lama in exile in India, the Chinese authorities also initiated a more conciliatory ethnic and economic development policy. Tibetans were encouraged to revitalize their culture and religion. Infrastructure was developed to help Tibet grow. But pro-independence protests in Tibet that started in 1987 led to the declaration of martial law in the region in 1989. After martial law was lifted in May 1990, Chinese authorities adopted a more hard-line policy with stricter security measures, curtailing religious and cultural freedoms. At the same time, a program of rapid economic development was adopted which included much resented incentives encouraging an influx of non-Tibetans, mostly Han Chinese, into Tibet. This, Beijing hopes, will result in a new generation of Tibetans who will be less influenced by religion and consider being part of China in their interest, wrote Tibet expert Melvyn C. Goldstein in Foreign Affairs in 1998. “Even if such an orientation does not develop, the new policy will so radically change the demographic composition of Tibet and the nature of the economy that Beijing’s control over Tibet will not be weakened.”

Government-in-exile in India

When the Dalai Lama sought exile in Dharamsala in northern India in 1959, India arguably became a key player in the conflict. India now is home to about 120,000 Tibetans, the world’s largest Tibetan community outside of Tibet. But since 1952, India has always regarded Tibet as an integral part of China and does not encourage overt criticism of China by Tibetans in exile. Sumit Ganguly, a professor of political science at Indiana University, is openly critical of the Indian policy. “If India is indeed a liberal democracy,” he says, “it must be willing to speak out about gross Chinese human rights violations.”

Ganguly believes India’s administration can exert pressure on China by allowing Indian Tibetans to demonstrate peacefully without interference, and by treating the Dalai Lama as a head of state instead of a spiritual leader. But there are many Indian analysts who believe otherwise. “There is interest on both sides, very deep interest, to see that what is happening is not allowed to upset the apple cart—the present momentum of India-China relations,” says Mira Sinha Bhattacharjea, former director of the Institute of Chinese Studies in New Delhi. Relations between India and China, long fraught with resentments including a short border war in 1962, recently have warmed. China became India’s biggest trading partner in 2007. The two countries have also seen a thaw in diplomatic relations.

The United States and the West

Experts say U.S. policy has done little to help resolve the Tibet issue. According to A. Tom Grunfeld, a professor of history at Empire State College,  Washington’s policy is inherently contradictory. “While officially recognizing Tibet as part of China,” he writes, “the U.S. Congress and White House unofficially encourage the campaign for independence.”

“While officially recognizing Tibet as part of China, the U.S. Congress and White House unofficially encourage the campaign for independence.” — A. Tom Grunfeld, Empire State College

Goldstein writes Washington has been opportunistic in its dealings (PDF) with Tibet. During the Cold War in the 1950s and 1960s, the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) covertly funded and armed Tibetan guerilla forces to fight against communist China. But even during this period of covert support, Washington’s official position on Tibet did not change. It continued to recognize it as a part of China. CIA’s covert funding stopped in 1971 as U.S. interest in Tibet waned due to warmer relations with China. But pressure from the Tibet lobby complicated the policy environment, argues Grunfeld. In the 1980s, Tibetans in exile launched a new strategic initiative with an aim to secure increased political support from the United States and the West to exert pressure on China.

An important element in this new strategy was visits and speeches by the Dalai Lama in the West. In September 1987, the Dalai Lama spoke before the Congressional Human Rights Caucus in Washington. The following June, he made another important address at the European Parliament in Strasbourg. For the first time publicly, he laid out a willingness to accept something less than independence for Tibet. Calling for genuine autonomy for Tibet within the framework of China, the Dalai Lama proposed that Tibet have full control over its domestic affairs but that China could remain responsible for Tibet’s defense and foreign affairs. He reiterated this “middle-way approach” in a 2001 address to the European parliament. The Tibet issue has also won popular sympathy in the west including interest of Hollywood actors like Richard Gere who actively lobby for the Tibetan cause. But the success of the international campaign for Tibet has bolstered hard-liners within the Chinese government, experts say, thereby worsening conditions for the Tibetan people.

A Difficult Solution

Tibet is very important to China’s sense of nationhood, says CFR’s China expert Adam Segal. “There is a fear that if Tibet gets independence, Uighurs and Taiwan will want independence.” Segal notes that Chinese authorities have frequently suggested that they are just waiting for the Dalai Lama to die, expecting Tibetan nationalism to disappear after his death, but says this may be a miscalculation. “I think the more radical Tibetans would direct the movement for independence after Dalai Lama’s death.”

Experts agree that unless there is political reform within China, the resolution of the Tibetan question remains bleak. “The historical question was never unsolvable,” says Barnett. “It would not have been a problem necessarily if China had been able to develop policies for Tibet that were acceptable to most Tibetans.” In November 2008, the Dalai Lama said his efforts to bring autonomy to Tibet had failed so far and called for a meeting of Tibetans from around the world to consider the future of the Tibetan movement. The meeting, which took place Nov. 17-22 in Dharamsala, India, drew more than five hundred Tibetans. Though the meeting closed with what was described as a “strong endorsement” of the Dalai Lama’s “middle-way” approach, participants also “clearly stated” they might seek independence if talks with China do not bring progress “in the near future.”

India and the Tibetan Tragedy

By C. H. Alexandrowicz

An apparently insignificant announcement concerning Indo-Tibetan relations was made to the press on September 16, 1952, by the Indian Ministry of External Relations. It stated that the 16-year-old Indian Mission in Lhasa, the capital of Tibet, would be wound up and replaced by a Consulate-General; but that whereas the Mission maintained direct relations between India and Tibet, the new Consulate-General would be accredited to China. In other words, Indian recognition seemed to be entirely withdrawn from Tibet and thus the period of coöperation between the two countries on a basis of equality came to an end. As the initiation of this cooperation was one of the cornerstones of Indian foreign policy under British rule its termination must be the expression of some basic change in policy; and there is no better way of understanding this change than by recalling briefly the history of Indo-Tibetan relations.

Tibet is bordered by Chinese Turkestan and Mongolia in the north; by China in the east; by Burma, India, Bhutan, Sikkim and Nepal in the South; and by India (Punjab and Kashmir) in the west. Bhutan and Sikkim were formerly part of Tibet but are now separate states under Indian suzerainty. Both Tibet and Nepal were under Chinese suzerainty, but whereas the Nepalese threw off Chinese domination, Tibetan efforts to terminate dependence were never completely successful. However, the term Chinese domination calls for explanation. Chinese suzerainty meant at first the overlord-ship of the Manchu Emperors. With their downfall, Chinese Republican influence in Tibet decreased rapidly and Chinese Communist influence was considered a menace in Lhasa long before the defeat of Chiang Kai-shek.

After the establishment of Buddhism and of the Church of the Lamas, Tibet, once a warring nation, became peace-loving and determined to fend off both Western influence and militarism as a means of avoiding international disputes. There is no other example in history of a nation dominated by a religious creed and priestly organization which was so firm in its policy of avoiding the drawbacks of modern civilization, even if this meant foregoing its benefits. Lacking significant armed forces, Tibet had to safeguard her independence by peaceful means; and this in recent centuries the Lamas succeeded in doing with admirable skill and wisdom. Her neighbors had considerable appetites and tried to find their way to Lhasa. Besides China there was Tsarist Russia, who after having established a hold over Buddhist Mongolia thought of further expanding her influence into Tibet. Russia renounced these intentions in 1907, by a treaty concluded with Great Britain. One of the basic difficulties of all intruders was the complete devotion and allegiance of Tibetans as well as of other Buddhists in that part of the world to the Dalai Lama who combined temporal jurisdiction with spiritual power. None of Tibet’s neighbors who had political ambitions was able to overcome the formidable barrier of seclusion, more impenetrable than iron curtains stretched between the pillars of brutal physical force and hostile isolationism.

India’s attitude towards Tibet was different from that of any other country. Gotama the Buddha was of Indian origin and the famous Bodhi tree near Gaya in Bihar, beneath which he sat in contemplation, is still today the sacred meeting place of all Buddhists of the world, whether from Tibet, Burma, Ceylon or Japan. All these countries adopted the great faith of the Enlightened, whereas India, his home country, finally rejected him for the Brahmanical religion.^[i] India is still to a great extent Brahmanical, and has not much sympathy or understanding for the Buddhist way of life. In shaping their own ideas about Tibet, Indian politicians could not find much enthusiasm in their hearts, political considerations apart, for “heretic” Tibet,

for which so many British explorers, traders and travellers developed understanding and even admiration. When British rule established itself in India in the nineteenth century, a number of treaties ensured the settlement of all controversial relations on the northeastern frontier. In a treaty between Great Britain and China, concluded in 1890, the former secured recognition of her protectorate over Sikkim. In 1904, Great Britain concluded a treaty with Tibet securing an open trade route frome Kalimpong in India, to Lhasa. Though direct relations were established between thetwo countries, Great Britain recognized Chinese suzerainty over Tibet in 1906. In1910 a British Protectorate over Bhutan was established. Thus India, under British rule, had produced a system of security by which her northeastern frontier could be considered more or less immune against the turmoil of Chinese politics. As shown above, the main elements of this security system were British India’s suzerainty over Bhutan and Sikkim, the free trade route between Kalimpong and Lhasa opened after Colonel Francis Younghusband’s expedition to Lhasa in 1904, and friendly relations with Nepal which ceased to be a vassal state in relation to China. Security on her northeastern frontier allowed British India to concentrate on the more difficult problem of her northwestern frontier bordering on Afghanistan.

In view of the constant Chinese infiltration into Tibet, British India had to consider how to maintain a balance of power there. Any sharp increase of Chinese penetration in Tibet was obviously a threat to British India’s security; while the elimination of Chinese influence from Tibet would obviously have caused a deterioration of Anglo-Chinese relations, provoked again the danger of Russian infiltration, and increased unnecessarily the responsibility of British India in relation to Tibet. Thus the balance was determined by a policy of keeping Chinese influence in check without eliminating it entirely. It was successful for years in keeping the famous Russian agent, Mr. Dorjeff, at a fair distance from the hearts of the Lamas. The policy was not formally laid down, but it found visible expression in the provisions of the Simla Conference in 1914, where representatives of British India, China and Tibet initialed a Convention of which the chief provisions were the following:

1. Tibet was to be divided into two parts: Outer Tibet, adjoining India and including Lhasa, Shigatse and Chamdo; and Inner Tibet, including the provinces near China and part of Eastern Tibet.

2. The principle of Chinese suzerainty over Tibet was recognized, but China was to observe strictly her limited position as a suzerain. Suzerainty implies that internal sovereignty is vested in the vassal state; in other words China could not, according to the Convention, infringe upon the internal jurisdiction of the Dalai Lama’s Government. On the other hand, suzerainty means no external sovereignty in the vassal state. Thus the Convention implied the right of China to conduct Tibet’s foreign affairs, with the exception of British India’s direct rights in Tibet, essential to the mutual balance in the Indian-Chinese-Tibetan triangle.

3. Great Britain declared that it had no other aspirations in Tibet, and in particular none for territorial expansion or aggrandizement.

4. The division of Tibet into Outer Tibet and Inner Tibet implied the predominant interest of British India in the former and of China in the latter. India always enjoyed the natural security afforded by the Himalayas. The passes leading from the Tibetan plateau into Sikkim and India are important trade routes. Noninterference of China in Outer Tibet best secured freedom of movement on these routes. Thousands of Tibetan traders used to arrive in India yearly over these passes to sell wool, hides and medicinal herbs in exchange for other goods. Thus the firm establishment of the Dalai Lama’s jurisdiction in this part of Tibet served the twofold purpose of promoting Indo-Tibetan trade and security of the northeastern frontier of India. British India was allowed to have her trade agents in Outer Tibet and later also established a Mission in Lhasa.

5. In Inner Tibet the Chinese were to keep certain internal rights, including responsibility for the maintenance of order.

6. Finally, the Chinese were to maintain a representative, called Amban, in Lhasa. As mentioned above, the Amban was later matched by the presence of the British Indian Mission to the Dalai Lama.

One of the tasks of the Simla Conference was also to define the northeastern frontier of India, particularly between Tibet and Bhutan, the vassal of British India where Chinese penetration remained a continuous threat.

Two days after the Convention was initialed, the Chinese Government refused to sign it. The British then informed China that they considered the Convention as in force between themselves and Tibet. A few weeks later the First World War broke out and Tibetan affairs were duly shelved. But the principles of the Simla Conference remained a reliable guide to British Indian policy in Tibet, based as it was on genuine friendship and on a mutually respected balance of power by which no more would be given to or withdrawn from either China or Tibet than was inherent in the balance itself.

Tibet was obviously to serve as a buffer state without giving up its autonomy in its own internal affairs. It was also obvious that British India’s action was dictated not only by British Commonwealth interests but by the natural requirements of any future Indian policy, whether connected with British rule or not. Problems of security and trade aside, there was also an increased need after the First World War for vigilance against the Bolshevist penetration which Chinese soldiers tended to import into Tibet. Communism was always less popular in Tibet than in India and Nepal, the reason being that the Dalai Lama’s Government was, and still is, primarily spiritual, abhorring physical force as a means of leading people to happiness and salvation.

II

The need for India to play an active part in protecting her security and interests in the northeast is all the greater today because of the strongly imperialist policies adopted by Communist China and the U.S.S.R. The ostensible objective of the Chinese invasion of Tibet is the “liberation” of the Tibetan people. But in fact Mao Tse-tung has assumed the expansionist rôle formerly played by the Manchu Emperors. In other words, Tibet in Chinese eyes is once again a province of China, composed of the present Tibetan territory plus all the areas which originally were Tibetan and later were lost to India or Nepal. Years ago, Tibet owned all of Sikkim down to Siliguri in India, including Darjeeling; it also owned Bhutan, now an Indian vassal state, and had Nepal as a protectorate. Nepal discontinued her quinquennial missions to Peking only about 40 years ago, and shook off Chinese suzerainty.

Thirty years ago, Sir Charles Bell, one of the greatest experts on Tibet, made clear in his work, “Tibet, Past and Present,”^[ii] that if the Chinese should disturb the Tibetan balance of power as laid down in the Simla Convention, both Nepal and India would be threatened. He also expressed grave concern about the future of the system of security initiated by the British in the event that India were to become independent. He foresaw that with a transfer of power from the British to an independent India the Simla policy would automatically break down, since, he thought, independent India whether through lack of interest or lack of firmness would not support Tibet against Chinese imperialism (yellow or red). In such circumstances Tibet would have to break away from the Indian environment, and Nepal, Bhutan and Sikkim would find it difficult to continue in friendly partnership with India; for when the inhabitants of these countries saw that India had abandoned the effort to maintain a balance of power in Tibet, and had assumed a passive attitude there, they would be tempted to turn to China of their own accord. One of Sir Charles Bell’s practical recommendations for delaying Chinese penetration in Tibet was to prevent Chinese agents from entering that country through India. He also noted that the lines of communication direct from Peking to Lhasa are highly inadequate and emphasized that if ever Chinese troops and officials succeeded in seizing Tibet the export of rice or other food grains and supplies to them through India should be prevented. It is significant that at the present time all Chinese missions enter Tibet via Calcutta and Kalimpong, and that Tibetan missions to China do not travel from Lhasa direct to Peking but take the same roundabout route by way of Kalimpong and Calcutta.

Let us now look at events in the last two years in the light of the above warnings and recommendations.

The Chinese invasion of Tibet started at the end of 1950. It embraced at first only part of what the Simla Convention had designated as Inner Tibet. At the end of December in that year the young Dalai Lama left Lhasa and moved to Yatung in the Chumbi valley, only 15 miles from the border of India, thereby making clear that he was ready to become an exile in India, as his predecessor had done 30 yearsbefore. As soon as this happened the Chinese invasion stopped and Lhasa remained temporarily free. The next development was that a delegation of the Tibetan Government was invited to Peking. On arriving there they were told that Chinese military headquarters would be set up in Lhasa, and when they protested they were informed that Tibet had become a province of China and that they would do well to recognize the fact. Then a treaty was submitted to them for signature. They first said they would take it to Yatung and ask the Dalai Lama for instructions, but under pressure they were forced to sign immediately. One is reminded of the procedure applied by Hitler in 1938 to the unfortunate President of Czechoslovakia, and later to other victims.

After signing the treaty the Tibetan delegation left Peking and travelled back to Lhasa via Calcutta and Yatung. Meanwhile the Chinese had captured the Dalai Lama, with the help of a few bribed lamas, and brought him to Lhasa. For some time the Chinese generals in Tibet worked under the cloak of the Dalai Lama’s authority; but having consolidated their power in the first half of 1952 they forced the Dalai Lama to dismiss all his supporters in the government and remain completely isolated. Furthermore, the Panchen Lama, next in importance to the Dalai Lama, was brought to Lhasa as his rival. When the two became friends theywere again separated. Finally the Chinese Government invited India to withdraw her Mission from Lhasa in order to destroy the last trace of Tibetan independence.

The Indian Government has now complied with Chinese wishes and sent a Consul General to Lhasa who is accredited to China and not to Tibet. Thus with a stroke of the pen India relinquished the old policy of security in the northeast, worked out during years of effort and negotiation. Indian public opinion is as yet unaware of the historical consequences of this move.

The Chinese penetration of all the previous dependencies of the Chinese Emperors is likely to increase. The exact sequence of events cannot be foreseen, but it seems that Nepal is already involved in serious internal troubles (not without Communist participation) and that Communist pressure in Sikkim, Bhutan and Darjeeling is increasing.

India, whatever her motives in abandoning a genuine Indian policy as initiated under British rule, has to wake up to the reality on her northeastern frontiers and to events which are likely to follow. Tibet is now definitely behind the Iron Curtain and news as to what is going on beyond the Himalayan passes is scanty. It is, however, certain that the Chinese are building a strategic road from Lhasa to the frontier of India and Sikkim. This is the same track along which Colonel Francis Younghusband’s army pushed in more primitive conditions in 1904 from India toLhasa, and there is no reason why it could not be used for aggressive purposes in the other direction. Accounts of Younghusband’s expedition mention the significant fort of Phari on the track below the peak of Chomo Lhari. The Chinese are reported to be building near the old fort a modern fort located in Galingk’a. They are also reported to be building, with the help of Soviet experts, several air bases all over Tibet, one at Lhasa and one on the plain between Lake Manasarowar and Lake Rukas, which is only 300 miles from New Delhi. It has been officially admitted by Indian politicians that there are Chinese military detachments stationed all along the Indian frontier. There are also rumors of atomic experts conducting investigations in uranium deposits in southern Tibet. The Chinese have printed a geographical map of China in which Bhutan and Sikkim are shown as part of China or Tibet. The matter has been recently discussed in the Indian Parliament and is, in spite of Chinese denials, a serious cause for anxiety. It is difficult at the moment to separate reliable evidence from hearsay. However, one thing certain is that the previous intercourse between India and Tibet has come to an end and that India has found herself close up against the Iron Curtain.^[iii] In case of armed conflict, a southward Communist thrust might take place in the first instance from China and Tibet into Burma. Even so, considerable Indian armed forces would be immobilized on the Himalayan passes and south of them. If these passes and the adjoining strategic areas are not adequately defended, another Communist thrust could, in case of war, follow from the north and east directly into the plains of India.

Whatever the future, the period of balance of power by political manœuvring is over; and if physical force is behind the unbalance it can be opposed only by physical force. A former Congress President emphasized in a speech in the Indian Constituent Assembly that compulsory military service would be one of the bestsafeguards of independence. Its purpose, in the first instance, would be the creation of a strong and efficient army and, moreover, the strengthening of national discipline essential to face hard facts.

^[i] “The Religion of Tibet,” by Sir Charles Bell. New York: Oxford, 1931, p. 21.

^[ii] New York: Oxford, 1925, p. 241.

^[iii] When Tibetan children and students who were studying in Indian schools and colleges went home for their holidays in Tibet, they were unable to return to India.